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The Future of Government Regulation
of Agriculture: Finance and Credit*
By J. W. Looney**
INTRODUCTION

In March, 1930, a sharecropper in western Arkansas signed a

chattel mortgage with a local bank in which he used as collateral
the following property:
1 - bay horse, 12 years old, Weigh 1000#, 15 hands high, Name
"Frank", Worth $50.00;
1 - bay horse, 10 years old, Weigh 950#, 15 hands high, Name
"Fred", Worth $50.00;
1 - red cow, 6 years old, Marked swallow fork in each ear, Worth
$50.00;
1 - red cow, 4 years old, Name "Jersey", Worth $45.00;
1 - John Deere Wagon, 3 inch, Worth $25.00;
1 - set of chain harness with leather breaching, complete with
bridles, lines and collars, Worth $15.00;
together with all increase of she livestock, and all of the crop of
cotton, corn and other produce which the said party of the first
part may raise, or in which he may have an interest for the year
1930, said crop to be not less than 6 acres planted in cotton, 15
acres planted in corn.'

The interest rate was ten percent, and the total amount of the loan
was $54.70! It was but three years later on May 12, 1933, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the Emergency Farm
Mortgage Act,' designed to provide assistance to financially dis-

tressed farmers. This action was a part of the early New Deal efPresented originally as part of an Agricultural Law Seminar speech at the
dedication of the College of Law Building, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb,
Illinois, March 18, 1983.
** Dean, University of Arkansas School of Law. B.S.A., University of Arkansas; M.S., University of Missouri (Columbia); J.D., University of Missouri (Kansas
City); M.S., University of Missouri (Columbia).
1. From a chattel mortgage, 1930, signed by the author's father with a bank
in Mena, Arkansas.
2. This legislation was a part of the Emergency Relief Act of 1933 in which
rural rehabilitation corporations were established to make loans to farm families.
See Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 30, § 2(a), (b), 48 Stat. 55. Section 2(a) establishes
the corporation; section 2(b) sets the limits of the amounts it can lend.
*
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forts to provide some relief to the troubled farm sector, and it represented direct government involvement in agricultural finance
and credit.3 It also presented a clear statement of government policy relating to the small family farm. Current policy is less clear.
Conflicts over access to credit and the resultant effects on the
structure of agriculture, over the goals and programs of Farmers
Home Administration, and over privatization of the farm credit
system are but a sampling of the conflicting forces at work today in
molding agricultural credit policy.
Agricultural finance and credit has changed drastically since
the thirties. However, farmers, as they did then, borrow against
their crops, livestock, equipment and land to carry on the business
enterprise. The level of borrowing is staggering in the aggregate
and, at best, burdensome for the average farmer. Aggregate farm
debt on January 1, 1983, was over $215 billion-having more than
tripled since 1970 and almost doubled since 1978." If the trend
toward increasing debt continues, the aggregate farm debt could
reach a trillion dollars by the year 2000. This represents a figure of
approximately $375,000 per farm.'
An increasing debt to equity ratio reflects the increasing reliance on the use of credit by farmers. The average farmer has over
twenty percent of the total farm equity committed to liability for
debt. Also, average equity per farm has declined. Even though
the debt/equity ratio is quite acceptable by lending standards, producers are increasingly carrying more debt in relation to farm income, thus increasingly confronting cash flow problems. Furthermore, interest makes up almost twice the amount of total
production costs than was the case ten years ago.8
3. The Farm Credit Act of 1933, ch. 98, § 5, 48 Stat. 257, established the

Farm Credit Administration as a part of this effort as well.
4. USDA, OUTLOOK AND SITUATION: AGRICULTURAL FINANCE 5 (Dec. 1982).
5. These projections are based on current farm numbers. The figure per farm

could be even higher if the trend toward fewer, but larger farms also continues.
For a discussion of the trends in farm size and numbers, see USDA, A TIME TO
CHOOSE: SUMMARY REPORT ON THE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE

5 (Jan. 1981).

6. See Thompson, Farm FinancialDistress: Nature, Scope and Measurement of the Problem, 4 AGRIC. L.J. 450 (1983). This compares to the average U.S.

corporation which is leveraged up to 55% of assets. Russians Ready to Talk: New
Grain Pact, 30 NAT'L FARMERS UNION WASHINGTON NEWSLETTER 1 (No. 20 May,
20, 1983).
7. USDA, supra note 4.

8. This is brought about, in part, due to higher interest rates and is a particular problem when viewed in relation to farm income. See Thompson, supra note
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In addition, the number of business failures and bankruptcy
filings has increased dramatically in the early 1980's (for farmers
as well as non-farmers). 9 Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)
delinquency rates as of August 31, 1982, were about twenty-five
percent nationally (from a low of eight percent in Utah to a high of
fifty-four percent in Georgia). 10 Many of these farm borrowers will
not remain in farming.
According to a study covering the years 1910 to 1978, reported
in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, farm bankruptcies are approaching the rate of the late 1930's.11 Contributing
factors include the increasing scale of farm size and inputs, the
change in capital structure of farming, farm income fluctuation,
U.S. agricultural policy, and macro-economic policy. The study analyzed these factors and concluded that increases in farm size, the
adoption of capital-intensive production methods, and changes in
the capital structure have led to a heightened vulnerability to income shortfalls. Farm income fluctuations, then, parallel failure
rates in the farm sector although off-farm income may, obviously,
affect the farmer's ability to remain in farming during times of
financial distress. The analysis further indicated, as one would expect, that federal macro-economic policies bear heavily on the success of farms. On the other hand, federal agricultural policy, particularly price and income support programs, may have been
reactive in nature rather than a direct contributing factor to either
the success or failure of farm operators. To the extent that government agricultural policies encourage larger farm size and more intensive capital usage, they may have contributed to the heightened
vulnerability of farmers to bankruptcy."'
6, at 452.
9.

DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

ANN. REP. (1981). From 1970 until 1979, the number of bankruptcy filings was

fairly consistent at about 200,000 per year. In 1979, 226,476 new cases were filed;

360,957 in 1980; 519,063 in 1981. Some of the increase might be attributed to the
1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, but the general condition of the economy is the
more likely factor contributing to the increase.
10. Athanassiadis, The True Story on Delinquency Rates, AGRiFINANCE 10
(Dec. 1982). The delinquency rate was even higher in early 1983 (53.4% in Janu-

ary). Taylor, Bad Loans Mount at Battered Farmer's Home, FARM J. 17 (July
1983).
11. Shepard & Collins, Why Do Farmers Fail? Farm Bankruptcies 1910-78,
64 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 609 (1982).

12. Id. at 614-15.
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GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL CREDIT

Government involvement in direct credit for agriculture dates
at least to the Homestead Act of 1862.13 But, during the early
1900's, farm credit, on reasonable terms, was difficult for farmers
to obtain. 4 A number of separate commissions reported to Congress on ways to solve what were perceived to be the farm credit
needs of farmers.15 These proposals led to the establishment of the
farm credit system and to the direct involvement of the government in agricultural credit.
Agricultural credit is supplied by governmental agencies, government-sponsored agencies (cooperatives) and by private lenders.
As of January 1, 1983, credit supplied by the farmer-owned cooperatives of the farm credit system made up about one-third of the
total outstanding farm debt.' e Government agencies supplied only
about fifteen percent of the total.17 Thus, direct government involvement in agricultural lending through these agencies plays a
relatively minor, though significant, role in the total availability of
agricultural credit.
Most direct governmental credit is supplied either through the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) or the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC). Farmers Home Administration provides a
number of financial assistance programs to farmers - the agency's
major expenditures being for emergency disaster loans, insured
13. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392.
14. Brake, A Perspective on Federal Involvement in Agricultural Credit
Programs, 19 S.D.L. REv. 567 (1974).
15. Id.
16. According to the USDA, supra note 4, at 10-11, credit, by source, was
supplied as follows:
Outstanding Non-Real
Estate Debt (billions)
Total
Individuals and Others
Banks
Farm Credit System
Life Insurance Companies
Farmers Home
Administration
Commodity Credit
Corporation
17. Id.

$ 105.03
19.53
35.87
21.08
14.98
13.57

Outstanding Real
Estate Debt
$ 109.99
32.00
8.47
47.80
13.00
8.72
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farm operating loans and insured farm ownership loans."'
The activity of FmHA is controlled by Congress through lending authorization and appropriations. 9 Therefore, the objectives to
be achieved are directly subject to congressional policy decisions.
As a general policy, FmHA administers its program so as to avoid
competition with credit available from other sources (the "no
credit elsewhere" test) and to encourage borrowers to transfer to
private or cooperative credit sources as soon as they are in a position to qualify for credit from these sources.2 0
The second major source of direct governmental credit is
through the Commodity Credit Corporation. These programs are
18. The 1982 actual expenditure and the 1983 appropriations for the agency
are as follows:
Farmers Home Administration 1982 Expenditures
and 1983 Appropriations
(Dollars in thousands)

Fiscal
year 1982

actual

Insured farm ownership loans
Guaranteed farm ownership loans
Insured farm operating loans
Guaranteed farm operating loans
Emergency disaster loans
Economic emergency loans
Insured soil and water loans
Guaranteed soil and water loans
Irrigation and drainage loans
Recreation loans
Indian land acquisition loans
Watershed & flood prevention loans
Resource conservation development loans
Total agricultural credit
insurance fund
*

$

657,747
3,856
1,203,680
47,329
2,173,412
0
24,777
0
1,313
712
1,037
1,050
885

$ 4,115,798

Fiscal year
1983

appropriations
$

700,000
75,000
1,460,000
50,000
1,540,000*
500,000**
47,100
6,000
0
0
12,000
26,000
4,000

$ 4,520,100

Emergency disaster loans fluctuate in accordance with the occurrence of natural disasters. This is an estimate, while the others are firmer budget figures.

** Guaranteed loans only.

Ag Indicators, FARM MONEY MGMT. 31 (Jan./Feb. 1983).
19. Frey & Lins, Covering Agriculture's Lending Needs: Part Three,
AGRiFINANCE 13 (Oct. 1979).
20. Fraas, Federal Assistance Programs for Farmers: An Outline for Lawyers, 3 AGRIc. L.J. 405 (1981).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

designed to support prices for agricultural products through interim credit availability. Nonrecourse loans (at a set loan rate for
various commodities) are made to eligible producers based on the
amount of the commodity produced. If the market price rises
above the loan rate, the producer may sell the commodity and pay
the loan principal and interest. If the market price falls below the
loan rate, the farmer may forfeit the commodity in full payment of
the loan principal and interest. Also, recourse loans are available
from the CCC for storage and drying facilities."'
Today, the Farm Credit System (FCS) is the major supplier of
agricultural credit. Credit is available for long-term real estate
financing through the Federal Land Banks; for short-term operating, crop, livestock, machinery and equipment financing through
the Production Credit Association; and for agricultural cooperatives through the Bank for Cooperatives. Federal money is not involved in the Farm Credit System-not even in the supervisory
role of the Farm Credit Administration."2
The Farm Credit System began in 1916 with government capitalization of the first Federal Land Bank. All government capital
was repaid by 1947. In 1923, the Production Credit Associations
were also capitalized by government money, but all was repaid by
1968. These cooperatives are now farmer-owned."3 The Farm
Credit Administration (FCA) was established in 1933 and initially
acted as an independent agency of the executive branch, then
moved to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1939.
When the government capital for the Federal Land Banks was repaid in 1948, the FCA was reestablished as an independent agency
with general supervisory and policy-making authority over the
lending institutions. Costs of the FCA are paid by assessments on
the institutions themselves. 4
GENERAL POLICY ISSUES

In addition to the direct involvement of the government in
FmHA and CCC lending programs and in the sponsorship of the
Farm Credit System, the government has played an indirect role in
achieving the objectives of agricultural credit policy by efforts to
21. Id. at 432.
22. Medero, Access to Capital: One of the Most Important Current Threats
to American Agriculture, 4 AGRIC. L.J. 491, 494 (1983).

23. Brake, supra note 14, at 571.
24. Id. at 575.
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improve money markets and lending institutions and by programs
designed to reduce the risk in agriculture. Thus, the farm producer
has become a more attractive lending client.
A major focus of agricultural credit policy has been to make
sure that farmers have access to needed credit at favorable rates
and terms. Credit availability has made it possible for farmers to
adopt technology and to increase the size of individual operations.
These trends raise serious questions concerning the future structure of agriculture. Three separate USDA sponsored studies have
focused on these questions.
In 1972, a USDA sponsored report, Who Will Control U.S.
Agriculture?, was released. 5 The report recognized that the future
structure of agriculture could be affected by the availability of
credit and, indeed, that those with favored access could eventually
control agriculture, particularly with regard to land ownership.
The report stated: "Credit policies that encourage large-scale enterprise and give them economic advantages over smaller, more
dispersed farming operations will force out the smaller operations,
reduce the number of support input supply firms, and produce a
different type of social structure in rural communities."26
This structural effect was reemphasized in a 1979 USDA farm
structure study, Structure Issues of American Agriculture.7 That
study concluded that structural change (decline in the number of
farms and increase in the size of farms) has been brought about in
part by the ready availability of credit for real estate purchase.'
Readily available credit also aids the shift to capital-intensive
production.
During the late stages of the Carter administration, the third
USDA report, A Time to Choose: Summary Report on the Structure of Agriculture, was released.29 This report raised serious questions concerning those policies, direct and indirect, which aid in
25. USDA, WHO WILL CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE? (1972) (published in
North Central Regional Extension Pub. No. 32).
26. Id. at 33.
27. Lins, Credit Availability Effects on the Structure of Farming in USDA,
No. 438, at 134
(1979). See also Lins & Barry, Availability of FinancialCapital as a Factor of

STRUCTURE ISSUES OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE, AGRIC. ECON. REP.

Structural Changes in the U.S. Farm Production Sector in FARM

STRUCTURE:

A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHANGES IN THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF FARMS (U.S.

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Apr. 1980)).
28. Lins, supra note 27, at 134-35.
29. USDA, supra note 5, at 5.
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making credit available and at the same time: (1) contribute to
inefficient resource use (over-investment and over-production); (2)
lead to an increased dependence on capital and energy intensive
technology; (3) contribute to inflation of land prices; and (4) lead
to concentration of production in fewer and larger firms. A particularly disturbing projection was that over one-half of borrowed
funds in the 1980's will be for the purpose of transfers of ownership and will add little to the actual productive capacity of the
farm sector. 80
The report concluded that public credit policies deserving emphasis are those consistent with the several goals of agricultural
and food policy. Among these goals are:
Assuring that agriculture has competitive access to private
capital markets at competitive rates...
Augmenting the workings of private markets to provide direct loans, insured loans and guaranteed loans... to those who
would not otherwise be able to compete for funds but, if funded,
would contribute to achieving the goals of agricultural policy...
Reducing the growing dependence of farmers on emergency
credit...
Refocusing the programs and priorities of the Farmers Home
Administration more toward those in agriculture who meet credible tests of need and who, if helped can expect to ultimately contribute to improved performance of the farm sector.31
CONFLICTS IN POLICY REGARDING FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION

The Farmers Home Administration's credit policies have been
the focus of attention in recent months. While FmHA's general
policy objective is to serve borrowers who cannot obtain credit
elsewhere, the conclusion of the structure study was that the
agency's multi-faceted credit programs have expanded farmers'
perceptions of their capacity to borrow and have encouraged riskier production and marketing and more aggressive financial
plans.8 2 The overall conclusion was that:

Public lending programs imply an element of subsidy and thus
sharing of risk between farmers and the general public. An implication for structure is that farmers tend to behave as though risk
were reduced or even removed, make less efficient use of resources
30. Id. at 114.
31. Id. at 123.
32. Id. at 118.
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in the short run, and bid up values of land and other assets. 33
In addition to these questions concerning FmHA policy,
FmHA's operating procedures have been criticized in recent
months by farmers and by members of Congress. A conflict is
brewing between Congress and the executive branch concerning
the agency's economic emergency loan program, its loan deferral
and/or moratorium procedures, and its foreclosure policies.
The conflict, in part, developed over the failure of the agency
to use $121 million in operating loan funds earmarked for limited
resource borrowers or to use any of $600 million in economic emergency loan funds available in fiscal 1982. 84 In addition, there were
indications in 1982 that a goal of reducing farm loan delinquencies
had been adopted by FmHA even if it meant forcing some farmers
out of business.3 5 Subsequent court cases and other reports of
FmHA reluctance to implement deferral authority lend credence to
the belief that FmHA has not used its existing authority to ease
s6
the credit situation.
A series of bills has been introduced in both houses of Congress to address FmHA operating policies. Generally the various
bills would: (1) renew the economic emergency program and require its implementation; (2) mandate use of funds for limited-resource farmers; (3) provide authority to reamortize or reschedule
existing FmHA loans over fifteen years instead of the present
seven years; (4) allow rescheduling at the lower of the existing rate
of interest or at the current new rate; (5) provide for a moratorium
on loan foreclosures or an automatic deferral upon request.3 7
33. Id. at 123.
34. 129 CONG. REC. S349-50 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Sasser); 129 CONG. REC. S221-22 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Huddleston); 129 CONG. REC. S223-24 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Boren).
35. 128 CONG. R. H211 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1982) (statement of Rep. Alexander); 129 CONG. REC. S223-24 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Boren).
36. 129 CONG. R.c. E420 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Pepper).
37. See, e.g., The Emergency Agricultural Credit Act of 1983, H.R. 1190, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. This bill was passed by the House on May 3, 1983, and is a modified version of some of the earlier, broader proposals. This bill retains the discretion of the USDA in dealing with delinquent FmHA borrowers and provides that
the farmers must show that they will be able to operate at a profit if a repayment
extension is to be granted. In addition, the economic emergency loan program is
limited to $300 in fiscal 1983 and $600 in fiscal 1984. The Senate version of this
credit legislation has yet to be acted upon.
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USDA (and, interestingly, the American Farm Bureau) has
opposed this legislation on the basis that automatic deferral is unfair to non-FmHA borrowers and would endanger the solvency of
rural lending institutions." The Secretary of Agriculture has indicated that FmHA has discretion to defer loans under some circumstances and that the agency rescheduled, reamortized or deferred
loan payments for about 42,000 producers for 1983.1" Even with
these actions, over 8,000 FmHA borrowers went out of business in
1982 (over 800 by foreclosure, 1,245 by bankruptcy, 1,909 by voluntary liquidation and the remainder by involuntary or forced
liquidation).'4
The issue of FmHA deferral authority has been joined in a
number of recently litigated cases.41 All these cases deal in some
way with the authority of FmHA to defer principal and interest
and to forego foreclosure of loans where the "Secretary deems necessary upon a showing

. . .

that due to circumstances beyond the

borrow's control the borrower is temporarily unable to continue
making payments when due without unduly impairing the [bor42
rower's] standard of living.1

38. See Block Opposes Bill for Deferral of Farm Loans, Arkansas Gazette,
Mar. 10, 1983, at 12D, col. 6; Payments on Farm Loans Should Not Be Deferred,
Farm Bureau Official Says, Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 15, 1983, at 6C, col. 1-2.
39. Sabatka, Block: Farmers Aren't Failing in Big Numbers, FFEDSTUFFS,
Mar. 21, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
40. IV SMALL FARM ADVOCATE 12 (Winter 1982-1983).

41. The Small Farm Advocate includes in each issue a FmHA Reporter section which summarizes litigation often unreported elsewhere.
42. 7 U.S.C. § 1981(a). That section provides:
In addition to any other authority that the Secretary may have to defer
principal and interest and forego foreclosure, the Secretary may permit,
at the request of the borrower, the deferral of principal and interest on
any outstanding loan made, insured, or held by the Secretary under this
title, or under the provisions of any other law administered by the Farmers Home Administration, and may forego foreclosure of any such loan,
for such period as the Secretary deems necessary upon a showing by the
borrower that due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control, the
borrower is temporarily unable to continue making payments of such
principal and interest when due without unduly impairing the standard
of living of the borrower. The Secretary may permit interest that accrues
during the deferral period on any loan deferred under this section to bear
no interest during or after such period: Provided, That if the security
instrument securing such loan is foreclosed such interest as is included in
the purchase price at such foreclosure shall become part of the principal
and draw interest from the date of foreclosure at the rate prescribed by
law.
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AGRICULTURAL FINANCE AND CREDIT

The most important of these cases is Curry v. Block,48 a challenge to FmHA procedures in implementing the deferral provision,
7 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In that case, the plaintiffs contended that they
were entitled to receive personal notice of deferral relief opportunities and should have been granted an opportunity to apply for the
relief before acceleration actions were commenced. The plaintiffs
requested that FmHA be enjoined for failure to promulgate appropriate regulations.
The court, after a good review of government involvement in
agricultural credit and a summary of the FmHA statutory lending
authority, concluded that the FmHA loan program "is a unique
mixture of social welfare legislation and legislation carefully
designed to supplement the business needs of high credit risk
farmers."" The court also concluded that the loan program of
FmHA is predominantly a form of social welfare legislation and
that in interpreting the deferral provision the court would attempt
to implement the social welfare goals of Congress.
Based on the logic that a borrower could not request deferral
and show eligibility unless he has notice of the contents of the
deferral provisions and an opportunity to be heard, the court in
Curry v. Block held that personal notice of the deferral opportunities was required. The court concluded that notice should be given
during the process of loan-making and, for delinquent borrowers,
at the beginning of the production season. The court further held
that the agency had a mandatory duty to implement the deferral
provisions of section 1981(a) through regulations and prohibited
FmHA foreclosures until regulations were promulgated on the eligibility criteria.
In a second case, Matzke v. Block," the court indicated that
FmHA had failed to follow the mandate of the statute to consider
foregoing foreclosure where there were circumstances beyond the
recipient's control. The court indicated that agency action would
be reviewed where issues were raised as to whether the agency's
action was arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.46
In a third case, Allison v. Block," the court followed the Curry
Id.

43.
44.
45.
46.
exercise
47.

541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
Id. at 513.
542 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Kan. 1982).
"When discretion is vested in an administrative agency, the refusal to
that discretion is itself an abuse of discretion." Id. at 1115.
Allison v. Block, No. 82-4300-CV-C-5 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (unreported).
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and Matzke cases and issued an injunction until such time as regulations were enacted, providing borrowers with an opportunity to
show that they meet the prerequisites of the loan deferral relief
granted in section 1981(a). In a more recent North Dakota case,
Coleman v. Block,48 the position was taken that the notice under
section 1981(a) relating to availability and criteria for deferral
should come prior to any actions for foreclosure, acceleration or
liquidation, and the court granted a preliminary injunction against
FmHA.
Other courts have reached opposite conclusions. In Moskiewicz v. Block, 9 the court indicated that section 1981(a) was
clearly permissive and that the Secretary was not required "either
to permit loan payment deferral or to promulgate regulations permitting such deferral." 50 In Neighbors v. Block, 51 the court concluded that Congress could have required notice to borrowers and
the promulgation of rules but did not do so. The court disagreed,
generally, with the prior cases. Because of the level of disagreement in these cases, it may be left ultimately to the Supreme
Court to resolve the issues unless congressional action makes the
issue moot.
PRIVATIZATION OF THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM

The Farm Credit System generates funds to be used for agricultural credit through the sale of consolidated bonds and discount
notes throughout the world. These are considered particularly attractive investments. As a government-sponsored cooperative, the
FCS receives some special benefits from being identified as a "federal" farm credit bank. The same is true for the Federal National
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), and the Federal Home
Loan Bank.59
As sponsored agencies, the cooperatives in the Farm Credit
System enjoy special tax advantages. The Federal Land Banks and
the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks are exempt from property
taxation (except for real estate taxation) and from taxation on
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Coleman v. Block, Civil No. Al-83-47 (D.N.D. 1983) (unreported).
Moskiewicz v. Block, No. 82-C-231 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (unreported).
Id. at A-24 of the order of Sept. 7, 1982.
Neighbors v. Block, No. LR-C-82-765 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (unreported).
Medero, supra note 22, at 494.
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earnings.5 Interest paid on the various securities is exempt from
state taxation. -4 National and state banks can invest in the sponsored agency securities without limitation, as can savings and loan
associations and credit unions. Federal Reserve Banks may invest
in the securities as a part of their open market operations. Agency
securities can be utilized by commercial banks as collateral for
public deposits and federal advances, and they can satisfy Federal
Reserve collateral deposits with FCS holdings. 5
The administration's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) suggested in 1981 (subsequently reaffirmed by the Secretary of the Treasury) that the special relationship between these
agencies and the government should be modified and that they
should become completely private organizations.5 The OMB proposal, as to FCS, would (among other things):
1) restrict with Federal Reserve regulations the amount of FCS
securities that can be held by commerical banks.
2) prohibit purchases of FCS securities by federally chartered
credit unions and savings and loan associations.
3) remove tax-exempt status of federal land banks and other FCS
agencies.
4) allow income from FCS securities to be taxed by state and local governments ....
5) require FCS to drop the name "federal" from its various
agencies.51
It has been suggested that these proposals were designed to make
FCS securities less attractive so investors would choose government issued securities and, by doing so, aid in the fight against
staggering budget deficits."s
Apparently, a USDA study suggested that the OMB proposals
would "cause turmoil" in financial markets and would result in a
shortage of farm credit.59 Following the completion of that report,
53. Id. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2055, 2098, 2134. Production Credit Association and
Banks for Cooperatives are taxed as cooperatives on their earnings. See also 26

U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383.

54. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2055, 2134.
55. 128 CONG. REc. H984 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1982) (statement of Rep. Jones)
(includes reprint of an article by Anthan, Staggering Farm Credit Rules Quietly
Proposed by Reagan, Des Moines Register, May 5, 1982).
56. THE FOOD AND FIBER LETTER 4 (Oct. 25, 1982).

57. 128 CONG. REc. H985 (see supra note 55).

58. Id. at H984.
59. This unpublished study, ordered by the Cabinet Council on Economic
Affairs, was completed by the Economic Research Service of the USDA in July,
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there were indications that the proposed changes were not to be
pushed by the administration." However, there have been other
indications that the issue is still alive in that the administration
has indicated a belief "in theory" that the FCS should be private."
The early position of the Farm Credit Administration appeared to be in opposition to the proposals.2 The agency has apparently now concluded that some privatization would be appropriate.68 For example, there appears to be a willingness on the part
of the FCA to forego some of the benefits of tax exemptions by
some cooperatives in the system in return for more flexibility in
offering nontraditional banking services to farm-borrowers." However, in spite of its apparent change in position on the issue, one of
the fears of the agency is that the issue will be submerged within
the overall budgeting process rather than addressed by specific legislative proposals. This would give less opportunity for affected
parties to share their views with Congress.0
In any event, the future role of the government regarding this
rural banking system, which operates totally outside the premises
of the monetary authorities, can have a long-range effect on agricultural credit. Most projections are that these proposals, if implemented, would make it more difficult for the Farm Credit System
to raise capital in the money markets and that the cost of borrowing would permanently increase. 6

CONCLUSION

Agricultural credit policy represents a study in conflicts: (1)
the goal of making credit readily available versus the effect on the
structure of agriculture; (2) the social welfare goal of making credit
available to high risk borrowers versus the government's need to
protect the business purpose of the FmHA programs; and (3) the
goal of encouraging private and cooperative credit sources versus
the effect on government budget deficits and inflation rates. These
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few examples amply illustrate the need to reexamine the role that
government does and should play in agricultural credit and
finance. Much less attention has been directed to agricultural
credit policy as compared to risk reduction programs for agriculture. Certainly, the effect of credit policy on the future of agricultural production, distribution, and marketing deserves the same
critical examination and evaluation that has been directed to other
government programs.

